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Abstract 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) is a mixed-motive game that offers two players the 
simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often-neglected 
aspect of such a binary-choice game, however, is that in many real-life encounters people can 
choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: To exit the social 
dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit 
opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. 
In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary-
choice and trinary-choice games, in the present study we used a design in which the same 
participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within-subjects 
design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that 
the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than 
in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit 
option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its 
endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of non-correspondence). In the discussion, it is 
argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should 
be critically assessed. 
Keywords: exit option; prisoner’s dilemma game; structural variation; cooperation; social 
welfare 
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Decision-Making in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game:  
The Effect of Exit on Cooperation and Social Welfare 
Social dilemmas are situations in which it is more profitable for each individual to act 
selfishly, but such behavior harms the collective (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983). 
Manifestations of social dilemmas are, among others, the choice whether or not to conserve 
community resources, to use public transportation, to donate to charity, to volunteer, and to 
vote in an election (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). As these examples 
illustrate, social dilemmas are omnipresent and of concern to many people. In order to gain a 
better understanding of social dilemmas, researchers have modelled these situations into 
mixed-motive games in which people must choose between cooperative and defective 
alternatives (Dawes & Messick, 2000). In this regard, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) is 
the most studied mixed-motive game, which has been used in literally hundreds of empirical 
studies (Au & Komorita, 2002). In this game, two persons each face a binary choice between 
a cooperative and a defective alternative. The relative order of the four possible outcome 
options defines this game. Particularly, the payoffs for the various outcomes are arranged in 
such a way that the best possible outcome for an individual is to unilaterally defect (DC), the 
second best outcome is mutual cooperation (CC), the second worst outcome is mutual 
defection (DD), and the worst outcome is to unilaterally cooperate (CD). 
Although the PDG provides the most straightforward example of a mixed-motive 
game, it neglects important properties of many real-life encounters. One such property is that 
people’s choices are often not restricted to either cooperation or defection. Indeed, many 
natural situations involve the opportunity to leave (or to not even enter) the interaction (for 
some illustrations, see Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, & Simmons, 1984; 
Seale, Arend, & Phelan, 2006). Exit options are important to investigate because they offer 
participants the opportunity not to be dependent upon their counterpart’s choice, and as such 
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avoid the possible losses that are associated with being exploited (see Weber, Malhotra, & 
Murnighan, 2004). In this vein, prior research has shown that in situations of interdependence 
people might have a preference to avoid the situation. Indeed, research on negotiations has 
shown that instead of making a risky choice, when given the opportunity, people might prefer 
to just exit the interaction (Shalvi et al., 2013). 
Referring to the “prisoner” aspect of the PDG, Boone and Macy (1999) aptly noted 
that “there is surprisingly little research on what happens when the doors to the prison are 
unlocked” (p. 33). Interestingly, of these scant studies of how the inclusion of an exit option 
(besides the options to cooperate and defect) affects cooperation rates in the PDG, most used 
simulations that focused on the effectiveness of different strategies in iterated games with 
parties who are involved in multiple rounds of the game (e.g., Congleton & Vanberg, 2001; 
Vanberg & Congleton, 1992; Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996). These simulations support the 
notion that an exit option can increase cooperation rates, because the possibility to exit allows 
a party to escape from dysfunctional interactions. However, based on these simulations, it is 
unclear how “real” participants react to an exit opportunity. In response to this, some recent 
studies have used an evolutionary perspective to investigate the effect of exit opportunities on 
cooperation in experiments with humans. In these studies, exit was operationalized as the 
possibility to switch partners, rather than to not be dependent on them; nevertheless, their 
underlying logic (one has to withdraw from an interaction in the first phase) and payoff 
structure are very similar to that of an exit option. In general, their results also seem to suggest 
that the opportunity to leave an interaction will increase cooperation rates (e.g., Barclay & 
Raihani, 2016; Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011).  
The question whether exit also positively affects the aggregated outcome of the 
players (i.e., social welfare) remains, however, largely unaddressed, as only a few prior 
studies have investigated how exit opportunities influence the revenues of the players. A 
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notable exception in this regard is the classic study conducted by Orbell and Dawes (1993). 
To minimalize the strategic effects from repeated play, participants in this study played five 
PDGs − each with a different interaction partner. In the binary-choice condition participants 
were obliged to choose between cooperation and defection, whereas in the trinary-choice 
condition the cooperative and defective alternatives were accompanied with an additional exit 
option. When one player selected the latter option, the payoff of both players was lower than 
the payoff of mutual cooperation, but higher than the payoff of mutual defection (cf. Seale et 
al., 2006; Vanberg & Congleton, 1992). Orbell and Dawes concluded that the opportunity to 
exit increased the aggregated outcome of the players as well as the relative gains of intended 
cooperators. According to the authors, these positive effects occur because cooperators are 
less likely to exit than defectors, causing levels of mutual cooperation to increase relative to 
situations where exit is not possible. Over the years, numerous scholars have cited this study 
(for some influential examples, see Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1996; Kollock, 1998; Ostrom 
1998; Rand et al., 2011; Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen, & Hauert, 2010; Tooby, Cosmides, & 
Price, 2006; Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997), and there has been a growing consensus in the 
literature that not only cooperation, but also social welfare increases when players are offered 
the option to leave the interaction. 
The aim of the present contribution was to build further upon the work of Orbell and 
Dawes (1993), in order to investigate in more detail the effect of exit on cooperation and 
social welfare. We believe that such a follow-up study is necessary because certain aspects of 
Orbell and Dawes’ study design might have had unintended effects on their findings. First, the 
availability of the exit option was manipulated between-subjects in the study of Orbell and 
Dawes (but also in various other exit studies). This design feature does not allow a direct 
comparison of the same individual’s game behavior across identical binary-choice and 
trinary-choice games. Instead, these authors had to make inferences about the numbers of 
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cooperators and defectors opting out by extrapolating the observed numbers in the binary-
choice groups to estimated numbers of “intending cooperators” and “intending defectors” in 
the trinary-choice groups. In the present study, we employed a within-subjects design in 
which each participant was confronted with both game types. This procedure allowed a direct 
comparison of cooperation and defection rates in similar games with and without the option to 
exit.  
Secondly, in the study of Orbell and Dawes (1993) the exit option was set-up in such a 
way that if one player selects this option, both players receive no earnings (i.e., a payoff of 
zero). Because of this particular set-up, unilateral defection and mutual cooperation had to 
generate positive earnings, whereas the earnings of mutual defection and unilateral 
cooperation had to be negative (i.e., DC > CC > E = 0 > DD > CD). Each game’s outcome 
structure thus consisted of a combination of gains and losses (for similar outcome structures, 
see Seale et al., 2006; Vanberg & Congleton, 1992). In our study, the relative order of the 
outcome options was similar as in prior exit research, but all outcome options generated 
positive outcomes (i.e., DC > CC > E > DD > CD = 0). We did this because prior research has 
indicated that gain- and loss-framed outcomes may affect decisions differently (see Aquino, 
Steisel, & Kay, 1992; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; McDaniel & Sistrunk, 1991). 
Additionally, although Orbell and Dawes (1993) varied the payoff matrices among 
their five games, they did not systematically manipulate specific game parameters in order to 
create these matrices. In retrospect, it should be acknowledged that the matrices selected by 
Orbell and Dawes were skewed toward defection, as of the five games two provided a strong 
and three (of which one was a duplicate) a moderately strong incentive to defect. Yet, none of 
the included matrices provided a strong incentive to cooperate. Hence, although Orbell and 
Dawes included strong game variations, they heavily focused on matrices that are situated 
within the spectrum of defection. In order to investigate the effects of exit over a broader 
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range of possible outcome structures, in the present study we employed matrices that are more 
balanced. More specifically, we included a greater number of payoff matrices in which the 
incentive to cooperate or defect was systematically varied through the manipulation of three 
crucial game parameters (i.e., endowment size, (a)symmetry, and non-correspondence), which 
are expected to have a significant influence on game behavior in both binary-choice and 
trinary-choice games.  
Objectives of the present study 
The present study aimed to extend prior exit research, and in particular the work of 
Orbell and Dawes (1993). In doing so, the present study centered on the clarification of five 
critical empirical issues.  
1. How does the addition of an exit option influence cooperation rates? 
Our first aim was to investigate in greater detail how the addition of an exit option 
influences cooperation rates in the PDG. Are people more likely to cooperate when the 
cooperative and defective options are complemented with an exit option? The results of 
Orbell and Dawes (1993; for similar findings, see also Barclay & Raihani, 2016; Orbell & 
Dawes, 1991; Orbell et al., 1984; Rand et al., 2011) indeed suggest this to be the case. Yet, it 
is important to note that in Orbell and Dawes’ (1993) study a measure of relative cooperation 
was used, within dyads that did not exit the game (i.e., number of cooperators / [number of 
cooperators + number of defectors]). This measure, however, did not include the participants 
who did exit. Even though the exit option may bolster the level of cooperation in the dyads 
that remain in the game (which thus reflects a relative increase in cooperation), it inevitably 
leads to a decline in the number of cooperators in absolute terms. As such, the presence of an 
exit option leads to a lower share of (mutual) cooperation in absolute terms. Although this 
absolute decrease in cooperation seems rather obvious (as the addition of a third option to a 
binary-choice set almost certainly reduces the absolute number of times that the first option 
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and second option are selected), each cooperative player who selects the exit option 
undermines social welfare by lowering the total revenues. A critical consequence of this 
absolute decrease is thus that it is expected to result in a decline (rather than a gain) in social 
welfare. This brings us to our first research question: 
RQ 1: How does the addition of an exit option influence cooperation rates, in both 
relative and absolute terms?  
2. Which participants are most inclined to choose the exit option? 
The second aim of our study was to investigate which type of person is more inclined 
to select the exit option. Are cooperative individuals more inclined to choose the exit option, 
or is this option more likely to be preferred by defective individuals? A view on who exactly 
uses the exit option is of importance to understand whether trinary-choice dilemmas indeed 
contribute to social welfare. If the presence of an exit option leads a person who would 
otherwise have cooperated to exit the interaction, society is deprived of the benefit that his or 
her cooperation would have elicited. Conversely, if the presence of an exit option leads a 
person who would otherwise have defected to exit, society is spared the cost that his or her 
defection would have incurred.  
In this regard, Orbell and Dawes’ (1993) data suggested that defectors are more prone 
to select the exit option than cooperators. Some earlier studies also reported that defectors exit 
more rapidly (e.g., see Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Orbell et al., 1984). However, Orbell and 
Dawes’ (1993) use of a between-subjects design (in which one group of participants played 
the binary-choice games, and another group of participants played the trinary-choice games) 
meant that this prediction could not be directly confirmed. The adoption of a within-subjects 
design in the present study enabled us to examine directly which type of participant most 
often employs the option to exit the game. More specifically, our design allowed us to record 
participants’ behavior in the binary-choice games in terms of how often they cooperated and 
EXIT, COOPERATION, AND SOCIAL WELFARE  9 
 
defected, which could subsequently be linked directly with how often they selected the exit 
option in the trinary-choice games. 
RQ 2: Which type of person (defectors or cooperators in binary-choice games) most 
often selects the exit option in trinary-choice games? 
3. How does the payoff structure influence choice behavior?  
A third aim of the present study was to examine if the choice to exit depends on how 
the outcomes of the game are structured. Although in the PDG the relative order of each 
outcome option is fixed, this game can be set-up so that either the incentive to cooperate or 
the incentive to defect increases. Such game variations are important to investigate because of 
the prevalence of such differences in real-world social dilemmas, and because increasing or 
decreasing the level of conflict within the PDG might alter people’s temptation to exit.  
In this vein, it must be emphasized that although Orbell and Dawes’ (1993) matrices 
included variations in terms of the magnitude of the outcomes that can be achieved by both 
players and the degree in which both players’ outcomes converge or diverge, the influence of 
these two game variations on game behavior was not systematically investigated. When 
endowments are high, there is more at stake than when endowments are low. As such, high 
endowments are expected to intensify people’s preference for either cooperation or defection 
(i.e., people who prefer cooperation will become even more cooperatively, whereas people 
who prefer defection will become even more defectively). The level of non-correspondence 
reflects the degree of conflicting interest. The more the outcomes of the two players are 
opposed to each other (i.e., high non-correspondence), the more room there is for defective 
behavior. The more the outcomes of the two players are in line with each other (i.e., low non-
correspondence), the more likely it is for cooperative behavior to occur. As a result of this, 
high levels of non-correspondence are expected to accentuate the incentive to defect, whereas 
low levels of non-correspondence are expected to accentuate the incentive to cooperate. Prior 
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research has revealed that, under binary settings, PDGs that involve greater outcome non-
correspondence indeed yield lower levels of cooperation (e.g., Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 
2000; Parks & Hulbert, 1995).  
Furthermore, although most prior research has examined PDGs with identical 
outcomes for both players, many social interactions are characterized by asymmetry in 
outcomes (for some examples, see Beckenkamp, Hennig‐Schmidt, & Maier-Rigaud, 2007). 
Indeed, many real-life interactions entail different outcomes for each player, even if everyone 
who is involved acts in the same way. The concept of (a)symmetry refers to whether the 
outcomes of both players are identical (i.e., symmetrical) or not (i.e., asymmetrical). In the 
present study, we included symmetric games that entail identical payoffs for both players as 
well as asymmetric games that present different outcomes for each player. Note that an 
important feature of these asymmetric games is that they actually take away the possibility to 
reach equality in outcomes. Indeed, in asymmetric games one player always earns more than 
the other does, and this regardless of the two players’ choices (so even under mutual 
cooperation and mutual defection the outcomes of the two players differ). As such, 
asymmetric games are expected to accentuate the incentive to defect, whereas symmetric 
games (which allow equal outcomes) are expected to accentuate the incentive to cooperate. In 
line with this reasoning, prior studies suggest that asymmetric outcomes result in less 
cooperation than symmetric outcomes under binary conditions (Croson, 1999; Lave, 1965; 
Sheposh & Gallo, 1973). Therefore, we decided to also manipulate (a)symmetry in our study, 
in addition to endowment size and level of non-correspondence (the two dimensions that were 
also varied by Orbell and Dawes [1993], albeit not systematically).  
The present study is the first (at least to our knowledge) to include in a single study 
design these three game parameters. Although some prior studies have investigated the 
influence of these game parameters under binary-choice settings, their influence in trinary-
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choice games remains largely unknown. As a result of this, our study of the effects of these 
game parameters is explorative in nature, and we therefore refrained from formulating 
specific hypotheses on how these parameters are expected to differently influence choice 
behavior under binary-choice and trinary-choice settings. Instead, we more generally assumed 
that if game parameters that generally lead to high cooperation rates in binary-choice games 
also result in high exit rates in trinary-choice games, then the addition of an exit option to 
these particular parameters is likely to result in a loss (rather than a gain) of social welfare. 
Based upon this reasoning, we formulated the following research question: 
RQ 3: Do the different game parameters (i.e., endowment size, (a)symmetry, and non-
correspondence) have parallel effects on cooperation (under binary-choice settings) 
and on exit (under trinary-choice settings)? 
 4. How does the exit option influence the earnings of cooperators and defectors? 
Although ample studies have investigated the influence of exit on cooperation, very 
little attention has been provided to how exit affects the players’ earnings. Therefore, our 
fourth aim consisted of investigating the influence of exit on the earnings of cooperators and 
defectors. According to Orbell and Dawes (1993; also see Orbell & Dawes, 1991) the 
availability of an exit option heightens the outcomes of people who tend to cooperate, 
whereas it generally lowers the revenues of people who are inclined to compete. Interestingly, 
when looking more closely at Orbell and Dawes’ (1993) results, it can be inferred that these 
differential effects are most pronounced in matrices in which the incentive to defect is highest. 
Yet, it is still unclear how the addition of an exit option affects the outcomes of cooperators 
and defectors when games are structured in such a way that the incentive to cooperate (instead 
of defect) is heightened. In the present study, we therefore investigated the earnings of 
cooperators and defectors over a broad range of payoff matrices in which the incentive to 
cooperate and defect was systematically varied over the continuum of possible outcomes. 
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RQ 4: How does the addition of an exit option influence the individual outcomes of the 
two players? 
5. How does the exit option influence the aggregated earnings of the players? 
Relative gains and losses for cooperators and defectors are one part of the puzzle, but 
how does the addition of an exit option influence the net wealth of the involved parties? This 
brings us to the fifth and final question that we aimed to tackle: Are the aggregated outcomes 
of the two players higher or lower in games with or without an exit option? This question is 
obviously of great significance (given the importance of social welfare for sustaining social 
stability), but remained largely unaddressed in the literature. Based on their data, Orbell and 
Dawes (1993) concluded that the addition of an exit option increased the aggregated payoff of 
the players, even though the outcomes of intended defectors were generally lower in games 
with an exit option. However, it might also be the case that the impact of exit is contingent on 
the game’s specific payoff structure, such that its effect on collective welfare is more or less 
prominent depending on the features of the game.  
RQ 5: How does the addition of an exit option influence the aggregated outcome of the 
two players? 
Summary 
In sum, we aimed to extend previous empirical findings relating to exit, by using a 
more elaborated study design in which type of game (binary-choice versus trinary-choice 
game) was manipulated within-subjects. A crucial element of our approach is that we 
investigated exit effects over a broad spectrum of matrices (that reflect important variations in 
real-world dilemma situations), by including not only games that provide a substantial 
incentive to defect, but also games that encourage cooperation. Moreover, we also 
investigated how the installation of an exit option affects the individual outcome as well as the 
aggregated outcome of the players.  
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Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and nine undergraduate university students participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credits. Students were invited to the laboratory in groups 
of 35 to 45 persons. Upon arrival, each participant was seated at a separate desk in front of a 
computer. Informed consent was obtained before the start of the study. Participants were first 
informed about the payoff structure of the PDG, and then answered three questions that 
probed their comprehension of the game’s outcome structure. Those who were not able to 
answer at least two of these three check questions correctly (N = 19; 9.1%) were excluded 
from the analyses. As such, the final data set included 190 participants (33 men, 157 women; 
Mage = 18.62, SD = 1.82). 
Procedure 
During the experimental session, participants played 32 single-shot PDGs. In each of 
these games, participants played against a different interaction partner. Participants were not 
directly connected to these interaction partners during the PDGs, but at the end of the 
experimental session they were (manually) paired with another student and paid according to 
the outcome of both players’ decision in one of the games. Participants were first presented 
with a set of 16 payoff matrices in which they had to choose between cooperation and 
defection (binary-choice games). Next, participants were presented with the same 16 payoff 
matrices, but now the cooperation and defection options were accompanied with an third exit 
option (trinary-choice games). In both set of games, the order of the matrices was randomized. 
The exact payoff structure of each matrix is included in Appendix A. In order to get an 
estimate of reliability, for both the binary-choice and the trinary-choice games Matrix 9 of 
Appendix A was repeated a second time; choices in these repeated games correlated relatively 
strongly (rs > .44, ps < .001). During the experimental session, participants also completed 
EXIT, COOPERATION, AND SOCIAL WELFARE  14 
 
several individual difference measures. These data are reported in a separate manuscript that 
deals with how personality and situational variables influence behavioral consistency in the 
binary-choice PDG (see Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, Bostyn, & Van Hiel, under review). 
Manipulation of the payoff structure 
 In both the binary-choice and the trinary-choice games, we varied the payoff matrices 
of the games by manipulating three crucial game parameters that reflect prevalent differences 
in real-world dilemma situations. Importantly, in order to systematically investigate their 
influence on choice behavior, these three game parameters were manipulated independently 
of each other (although the effect of (a)symmetry in outcomes on either player’s choice is 
confounded with the effect of either player’s endowment size; see Appendix A). The first 
manipulated game parameter was endowment size. In our study, we included high and low 
endowments; the high endowments were always two times as large as the low endowments. 
The second game parameter that was manipulated related to the (a)symmetry of the payoff 
structure. In this regard, we distinguished between symmetric games that entail identical 
payoffs for both players, and asymmetric games that entail different outcomes for each player. 
More specifically, the asymmetric games were asymmetric combinations of the high and low 
endowment symmetric games (cf. Beckenkamp et al., 2007). As such, in the asymmetric 
games the outcomes of one player were always twice as high as those of the other player. In 
the high endowment games participants received the high payoff and their partner the low 
payoff, whereas in low endowment games these outcomes were reversed. 
The final manipulated game parameter related to the degree of non-correspondence. 
The degree of non-correspondence can be expressed in terms of Rapoport’s (1967) K-index, 
which captures the benefit of mutual cooperation over mutual defection (i.e., distance between 
CC and DD outcomes) relative to the benefit of exploitation over the sucker’s payoff (i.e., 
distance between DC and CD outcomes). In order to create four different non-correspondence 
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levels, we decreased the payoff of the mutual cooperation outcome while simultaneously 
increasing the payoff of the mutual defection outcome to an equivalent extent (whereas the 
outcomes of unilateral defection and unilateral cooperation were held constant over the 
different game variants; cf. Schopler et al., 2001). Critically in this regard is that our broader 
range of matrices fully covers, and further extends, those used by Orbell and Dawes (1993). 
Indeed, in their study the five different matrices were characterized by a K-index of 
respectively 0.58, 0.33, 0.60, 0.50, and 0.60 (note that their third and fifth matrix were 
actually duplicates), whereas in our study the low, medium low, medium high, and high non-
correspondence levels were characterized by a K-index of respectively 0.80, 0.60, 0.40, and 
0.20. 
Results 
1. How does the addition of an exit option influence cooperation rates? 
Our first research question consisted of investigating whether the exit option increases 
or decreases cooperation rates, in both relative and absolute terms. Table 1 reports the number 
and percentage of participants that have chosen each of the choice options in both the binary-
choice and the trinary-choice games. Importantly, in the trinary-choice games cooperation 
rates were computed in relative terms (in relation to only defection; so here participants who 
decided to exit are not taken into consideration) and in absolute terms (in relation to both 
defection and exit; so here exit is taken into consideration).  
A comparison of the reported percentages in Table 1 reveals that, across the 16 
matrices, in relative terms the average cooperation rates increased by 7.6% (i.e., from 62.86% 
in the binary-choice games to 70.43% in the trinary-choice games), while the average 
defection rates (of course) decreased by a similar percentage (i.e., from 37.14% in the binary-
choice games to 29.57% in the trinary-choice games). However, adding a third option to a 
binary set will almost certainly reduce the absolute number of times that the two other options 
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are selected. Hence, when looking at the absolute percentages across the 16 matrices, the 
average cooperation rates decreased by 25.6% (i.e., from 62.86% in the binary-choice games 
to 37.31% in the trinary-choice games), while the average defection rates decreased by 21.0% 
(from 37.14% in the binary-choice games to 16.16% in the trinary-choice games).  
It can hence be concluded that, even though in relative terms cooperation rates 
increase, the addition of an exit option in fact reduces the absolute percentage of participants 
that cooperates in the game, and this even to a slightly larger extent than it does for 
competitive participants. Although this absolute decrease in cooperation might be self-evident 
(and not so interesting in itself), this decrease is nonetheless important as it might entail 
negative consequences for the players’ aggregated outcome under trinary conditions. 
 2. Which participants are most inclined to choose the exit option? 
Prior exit research suggested that defectors are more prone to exit than cooperators. 
But is this indeed the case? In this regard, our second research question consisted of 
investigating what type of person (defectors or cooperators in binary-choice games) is most 
likely to exit the game under trinary-choice settings. Important in this regard is that our use of 
a within-subjects design allowed us to record participants’ behavior in the binary-choice 
games in terms of how often they cooperated and defected, which could subsequently be 
linked directly with how often they selected the exit option in the trinary-choice games.  
In order to investigate this particular research question, we first performed a k-means 
cluster analysis on participants’ responses in the 16 binary-choice games, using the Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the appropriate amount of clusters. Prior research 
implicitly assumed that under binary-choice conditions there are consistent cooperators and 
consistent defectors. However, the AIC plot in Figure 1 shows that a three-cluster solution 
fitted the data best (and hence better than a two-cluster solution). To interpret these three 
clusters we computed a cooperation index by counting the total number of cooperative 
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choices across the 16 binary-choice games. Relating the clusters to this cooperation index 
revealed that there is a first group of participants that strongly prefers defection (MCoopIndex = 
3.36, SD = 2.38; N = 44), a second group of participants that switches between defection and 
cooperation (MCoopIndex = 9.46, SD = 1.86; N = 72), and a third group of participants that has a 
strongly preference for cooperation (MCoopIndex = 14.62, SD = 1.57; N = 74). Note that this 
categorization thus highlights the interesting category of switchers (in addition to defectors 
and cooperators), who are actually inconsistent in their game choices. 
To investigate which of these three groups of participants (defectors, switchers, or 
cooperators) is most prone to select the exit option (when this option is made available), we 
subsequently conducted an ANOVA analysis with the exit index (which reflects the total 
number of exit choices across the 16 trinary-choice games) as the dependent variable and the 
three clusters as a predictor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of our three 
groups on exit behavior, F(2, 187) = 15.91, p < .001, R2 = .15. Pairwise comparisons using 
Tukey-tests revealed that the group of defectors (MExitIndex = 9.48, SD = 4.02) and the group of 
switchers (MExitIndex = 8.01, SD = 3.72) exited significantly more often (both ps ≤ .001) than 
the group of cooperators (MExitIndex = 5.47, SD = 4.73). The difference between defectors and 
switchers, however, did not reach statistical significance (p = .063).  
In sum, the results of our analyses showed that people who often defect in binary-
choice games more often select the exit option in trinary-choice games than people who 
frequently cooperate in binary-choice games. Based on this finding, it can be concluded that 
defectors are indeed more prone to exit than cooperators. However, our analyses additionally 
revealed that exit also serves as an escape road for those participants who feel no strong 
tendency for either cooperation or defection in the binary-choice games (i.e., the group of 
switchers, who seem to be indecisive in their choices for either cooperation or defection).  
 3. How does the payoff structure influence choice behavior?  
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 Our third research question pertained to the effects of game outcome structure on 
choice behavior in both binary-choice and trinary-choice games. More specifically, we 
examined if the systematic manipulation of three crucial game parameters – that is, 
endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of non-correspondence – has similar effects on 
cooperation (in the binary-choice games) and exit (in the trinary-choice games). Note that 
such a structural investigation of the different game features is important in order to be able to 
judge the efficacy of the exit option. Whereas the influence of our three game parameters on 
choice behavior in the binary-choice games was investigated within a binomial framework, 
the analysis of the trinary-choice games required a multinomial approach. The results of both 
types of analyses are described below. 
Influence of payoff-structure under binary-choice conditions 
 We first examined the data of the binary-choice games with a generalized linear mixed 
model (GLMM), estimating both random intercepts and random slopes at the participant 
level, with a logistic link function using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015; R Core Team, 2017). The statistical results (odds ratios, standard errors, and p-
values) of these analyses are reported in Table 2. This table reports the main effect of 
endowment size, (a)symmetry, and non-correspondence, as well as the interaction effect 
between endowment size and (a)symmetry. We incorporated this particular interaction 
because it is an essential part of our design (i.e., in order to create asymmetric outcomes we 
used the two different endowment sizes). To ease the interpretation of our results, below we 
discuss the effects of these game parameters in terms of how they influenced the predicted 
probabilities for participants’ decisions. The predicted probabilities are visualized in Figures 
2a to 5a. 
Several interesting results emerged from these analyses. First of all, our model showed 
a significant main effect of endowment size. This effect is displayed in Figure 2a, which 
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shows that in binary-choice games participants were more likely to cooperate in games with 
high rather than low endowments. Additionally, our model also revealed a significant main 
effect of (a)symmetry. As displayed in Figure 3a, participants were more likely to cooperate 
in symmetric binary-choice games than in asymmetric binary-choice games. However, the 
results for endowment size and (a)symmetry were also qualified by a significant interaction, 
which is visualized in Figure 4a. This figure shows that in asymmetric binary-choice games 
participants were more likely to cooperate under high than under low endowments. In 
symmetric binary-choice games, however, endowment size hardly affected cooperation rates. 
Finally, our model also revealed a significant main effect of non-correspondence. As shown in 
Figure 5a, the predicted probability of cooperation was higher in binary-choice games with 
lower levels of non-correspondence than in binary-choice games with higher levels of non-
correspondence.  
Influence of payoff-structure under trinary-choice conditions 
 To analyze the influence of the three game parameters on choice behavior in the 
trinary-choice games, we subsequently fitted a multinomial mixed logit model using the 
mlogit package in R (Croissant, 2012). We report the results of a random intercept-only 
analysis (as random slope models did not fully converge). The statistical results (odds ratios, 
standard errors, and p-values) of these analyses are reported in Table 3. Again, this table 
reports the main effect of the three situational manipulations, plus the interaction between 
endowment size and (a)symmetry. Note that in these analyses the defection option was used 
as the reference category, so in Table 3 the odds ratios for cooperation and exit are given with 
respect to the defection option. Because this makes our results very hard to interpret, below 
we again discuss our results in terms of predicted probabilities. Figures 2b to 5b display the 
predicted probabilities. 
EXIT, COOPERATION, AND SOCIAL WELFARE  20 
 
 Again, several interesting findings emerged. The main effect of endowment size is 
shown in Figure 2b. This figure reveals that in the in trinary-choice games the predicted 
probability of cooperation was very similar in games with high and low endowments, but the 
predicted probability of exit behavior was higher in games with high endowments than in 
games with low endowments. As a result of this, the probability of defection was lower in 
high endowment trinary-choice games than in low endowment trinary-choice games. We 
uncovered a similar pattern of results for symmetric versus asymmetric trinary-choice games 
(see Figure 3b): The (a)symmetry manipulation did not seem to influence participants’ rates 
of cooperation, but symmetric games were associated with higher levels of exit behavior and 
lower levels of defection than asymmetric games. Here too, endowment size and (a)symmetry 
interacted significantly. This interaction effect is shown in Figure 4b. In asymmetric trinary-
choice games high endowments caused higher rates of exit behavior and lower rates of 
defection than low endowments (while cooperation stayed almost the same), whereas 
endowment size hardly had an effect on participants’ choices in symmetric trinary-choice 
games. Finally, the main effect of non-correspondence is shown in Figure 5b. This figure 
reveals that, in trinary-choice games, lower levels of non-correspondence were associated 
with higher rates of cooperation and lower rates of both defection and exit behavior than 
higher levels of non-correspondence.  
Summary 
 From these analyses, it can be concluded that in both the binary-choice and the trinary-
choice games participants’ choices were significantly affected by the structure of the game. 
And, even more importantly, a comparison of Figure 2a with Figure 2b and of Figure 3a with 
Figure 3b reveals that those game parameters that most strongly encourage cooperation in the 
binary-choice games (i.e., high endowments and symmetry in outcomes) have almost no 
effect on cooperation in the trinary-choice games. Instead, in the trinary-choice games these 
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particular parameters most strongly boost the predicted probability of exit behavior. The 
parallel effects of endowment size and (a)symmetry on cooperation (in the binary-choice 
games) and exit (in the trinary-choice games) are of special importance because they may 
have repercussions for the outcomes that the different game variants generate. For the non-
correspondence manipulation, we did not find such parallel effects (compare Figure 5a with 
Figure 5b). 
 4. How does the exit option influence the earnings of cooperators and defectors? 
Our fourth research question consisted of investigating how the exit option affects the 
players’ individual outcomes. In order to answer this particular question, for each of the 16 
games, we computed the earnings of cooperators and defectors (and this separately for the 
binary-choice and the trinary-choice games). Table 4 provides an overview of these individual 
earnings. Note that these calculations are based on the reported frequencies of the different 
outcome options within the entire study population and on the payoff that each outcome 
option generates (see Table 1 for the exact percentages and Appendix A for the exact payoff 
structure of each matrix). A more detailed description of these calculations is provided in 
Appendix B.  
As shown in Table 4, in 11 of the 16 matrices cooperators obtained higher outcomes in 
games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. This is also reflected by the 
finding that, across the 16 matrices, cooperators earned about 10.5 euro more in the trinary-
choice games than in the binary-choice games (i.e., a total of 115.97 euro in the binary-choice 
games versus 126.45 euro in the trinary-choice games), which is thus equivalent with a gain 
of 9.2% − a difference that is statistically significant, t(15) = 2.40, p = .03. Notably, the five 
matrices in which the outcomes are lower with exit than without exit are the ones in which the 
higher cooperation rates were reported in the binary-choice games (compare the earnings 
reported in Table 4 with the percentages reported in Table 1). Conversely, in 13 of the 16 
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matrices defectors earned less in games with an exit option than in games without an exit 
option. Across al 16 matrices, defectors earned about 19.1 euro (8.9%) less in the trinary-
choice games (a total of 156.91 euro) than in the binary-choice games (a total of 175.97 euro), 
t(15) = -4.57, p < .001.  
Taken these findings together, it can be concluded that across all games the addition of 
an exit option led to an increase in the earnings of cooperators, but at the same time it 
decreased the earnings of defectors. The opportunity to exit the game hence thus results in 
gains for cooperators, but losses for defectors. 
5. How does the exit option influence the aggregated earnings of the players? 
In order to investigate our fifth research question, which asks how the exit option 
affects social welfare, for each matrix we also computed the aggregated outcome of the 
players. Table 4 provides an overview of the players’ aggregated earnings. Here too, these 
calculations are based on the frequencies of the different choice options within the entire 
study population and on the payoff of each of the possible outcomes (see Appendix B for 
more information on these calculations).  
Table 4 shows that in 10 of the 16 matrices the aggregated outcome of the two players 
was lower when the option to exit was present. This was also reflected by a loss of about 20.5 
euro across the 16 matrices in the trinary-choice games relative to the binary-choice games 
(i.e., a total of 276.65 euro in the binary-choice games versus 256.20 euro in the trinary-
choice games). The aggregated earnings in the trinary-choice games were thus 9.3% lower 
than in the binary-choice games, this reflects a significant difference, t(15) = -2.77, p = .014. 
Critically, a closer inspection of Table 4 (in comparison with the percentages reported 
in Table 1), however, reveals that whether exit increases or decreases the aggregated outcome 
of the players strongly depends on the game’s outcome structure, and more specifically the 
extent to which the game evokes cooperation or defection. Indeed, the ten matrices in which 
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the addition of an exit option reduced the aggregated outcome are actually those that induced 
the higher cooperation rates (more than 62% cooperation; see Table 1) in the binary-choice 
variants. Conversely, the six matrices in which the addition of an exit option slightly 
enhanced the aggregated outcome of the players (although it must be stressed that these 
positive exit effects were very small and almost trivial) are the ones that induced the higher 
defection rates (more than 46% defection; see Table 1) in the binary-choice variants.  
It can hence be concluded that, when taking a broad range of payoff matrices into 
account, the addition of an exit option decreased the aggregated outcomes of the players (i.e., 
the aggregated outcome of the two players is lower in games with an exit option than in 
games without the possibility to exit). Moreover, our results also indicate that the addition of 
an exit option seems to be especially negative for those games that evoke higher cooperation 
rates in the binary-choice game variants. 
Discussion 
Many societal conflicts arise from competing interests in terms of concerns for oneself 
versus the collective. A wide range of mixed-motive games has been employed in research to 
study these competing interests, with the most studied game being the PDG that provides 
people the choice between cooperating and defecting. However, a neglected aspect of this 
game is that in many real-life encounters people are not obliged to choose either option, as 
they can often also decide to leave the interaction. The present study builds further on prior 
exit research by Orbell and Dawes (1993; also see Barclay & Raihani, 2016; Congleton & 
Vanberg, 2001; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Orbell et al., 1984; Rand et al., 2011; Seale et al., 
2006; Vanberg & Congleton, 1992; Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996), which has resulted in a 
consensus in the literature that exit benefits cooperation and, as a result, social welfare. 
Scholars have, for instance, noted exit research to demonstrate “that defectors were more 
likely to exit than were cooperators” (Boone & Macy, 1999, p. 34), “higher cooperation rates 
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with an exit option than in the standard PD” (Bohnet & Kübler, 2005, p. 63), “that 
cooperators ended up with greater wealth at the end of play than non-cooperators” (Boone & 
Buck, 2003, p. 170), and “that when players are free to accept or reject play in PD-games, the 
aggregate social welfare increases” (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2010, p. 349).  
The major purpose of the present research was to explicitly test these assumptions 
with an expanded study design in which the same participants played similar PDGs with and 
without the option to exit, and in which structural game features were varied to explore exit 
effects in a more systematic way. This procedure also allowed us to explore the efficiency of 
the exit option as a strategy to increase the welfare of society. More specifically, we aimed to 
provide an answer to the following research questions: (1) how the addition of an exit option 
influences cooperation rates, (2) which participants are most likely to choose the exit option, 
(3) whether the choice to exit is dependent upon the structure of the game, and how the 
addition of an exit option influences (4) the earnings that cooperators and defectors obtain and 
(5) the aggregated outcome of the two players.  
Main conclusions  
 The following five conclusions can be drawn from our study. First, with regard to our 
research question how exit influence cooperation rates, our results indicated that although the 
addition of the option to exit increased cooperation rates in relative terms, it nevertheless 
lowered both cooperation and defection rates in absolute terms. And, particularly interesting 
in this regard is our finding that the absolute decrease in cooperation is somewhat more 
pronounced than the absolute decrease in defection. Even though this absolute decrease in 
cooperation may not be important on its own, the importance of this finding lies in the fact 
that it has negative consequences for social welfare (see below). Secondly, in light of the 
research question which participants are most likely to exit, our data showed that not only 
defectors, but also participants who switch between cooperation and defection in binary-
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choice games were more prone than cooperators to employ the exit option in trinary-choice 
dilemmas. In light of our third research question, we examined the influence of game 
structure on choice behavior. Our analysis indicated that the game’s outcome structure has a 
significant influence on exit behavior. Most importantly, however, is the finding that two of 
the three parameters that most strongly encourage cooperation in binary-choice situations 
(i.e., high endowments and symmetric games) also seem to most strongly favor exit in trinary-
choice situations.  
Our two final research questions relate to the outcomes that the two game types 
generate. In this regard, our fourth research question focused on how exit influences outcomes 
of cooperators and defectors. The present study indicated that although across all games the 
addition of an exit option led to an increase in the earnings of cooperators, it decreased the 
earnings of defectors. Hence, in the presence of an exit option cooperators individually earned 
more, defectors less. Our fifth and final research question consisted of investigating the 
influence of exit on social welfare. Even though exit benefited cooperation within a selected 
group of players that remained in the game (which reflects a relative increase in cooperation), 
the absolute decrease in cooperation that resulted from adding an exit opportunity nonetheless 
negatively affected social welfare. Particularly, our data revealed that the aggregated outcome 
of the two players was almost 10% lower in games with an exit option than in games without 
the possibility to exit. And, this negative effect of exit on collective revenues was strongest in 
games that were set-up to encourage cooperation. 
How do our findings relate to prior exit studies? 
If  we compare the results of our study with prior exit research, we note some 
consistencies but also some notable differences. A first notable difference is that in our study 
cooperation rates under binary-choice conditions were higher than in the study of Orbell and 
Dawes (1993). More specifically, Orbell and Dawes reported cooperation rates that varied 
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between 35% and 54% in their binary-choice games (see their Table 4, p. 794), whereas in the 
present study these rates varied between 40% and 80% (see our Table 1). A first possible 
explanation for this difference is that in Orbell and Dawes none of the included matrices 
provided a strong incentive to cooperate, whereas we included both matrices that provide a 
strong incentive to cooperate as well as matrices that provide a strong incentive to defect. A 
second possible explanation for this difference, however, is that the participants in our sample 
were more prosocial than the ones in the study of Orbell and Dawes. 
Secondly, our study corroborates prior evidence that, relative to defection, cooperation 
increased in the presence of an exit option (see Orbell & Dawes, 1993; see also Barclay & 
Raihani, 2016; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Rand et al., 2011). Yet, even though cooperation 
relative to defection increased, adding a third option (i.e., exit) to two behavioral choices (i.e., 
cooperation and defection) inevitably leads to a decrease of the absolute number of 
participants that cooperated, which leads to a loss of social welfare. By focusing exclusively 
on relative figures of cooperators versus competitors in prior studies, previous research 
appears to overlook the notion that exit can lead to welfare losses and therefore is a 
suboptimal strategy to maximize outcomes. 
Several previous studies (e.g., Orbell & Dawes, 1991, 1993; Orbell et al., 1984) have 
reported that defectors were more prone to exit than cooperators. However, this prior research 
could not directly infer which individuals were most likely to exit, as different groups of 
participants engaged in the binary-choice and the trinary-choice games. In the present study, 
we compared decision behavior of the same participants in binary and trinary situations by 
using a within-subjects design. This direct comparison complements prior exit research by 
showing that not only defectors, but also switchers often opt to exit when this is possible. 
These switchers are an interesting and fairly large group of participants that is expected to be 
indecisive when presented with the choice between cooperation and defection, and therefore 
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may prefer not to make a decision between cooperation and defection when there is a 
possibility to exit the interaction. Note that our finding that switchers prefer exit above 
cooperation and defection is interesting, as it can also help us explain why not only defection, 
but also cooperation rates substantially decline when introducing an exit opportunity. 
Although the present study clarifies who is most prone to exit, it is still unclear why they do 
so. Future research should tackle this “why” question.  
Most prior exit studies did not investigate how the outcome structure of the game 
influences participants’ choices, although differences in the outcome structure are prevalent in 
real-life settings. A remarkable exception is the seminal study by Orbell and Dawes (1993), 
which investigated, in a rather unsystematic way, how variations in endowment size and level 
of non-correspondence influence choice behavior. When we look across our different game 
variants, the addition of an exit option increased the relative welfare of cooperators, but at the 
same time decreased that of defectors. In this regard, our findings are actually very similar to 
those of Orbell and Dawes (1993; also see Orbell & Dawes, 1991), who also reported gains 
for intended cooperators and losses for intended defectors. However, when looking at the 
aggregated outcomes of the players, our data revealed that exit negatively affects social 
welfare. How can this latter finding be reconciled with the conclusion of Orbell and Dawes 
(1993) that social welfare increases when exit is available (see their Table 3, p. 793)? 
Importantly, these authors only included matrices in which the incentive to defect was rather 
high. We, on the other hand, included a broader range of payoff matrices in which the 
incentive to cooperate and defect was systematically varied. In this regard, we particularly 
selected our matrices in such a way that they covered almost the whole spectrum of non-
correspondence (i.e., the K-indices of our matrices varied from 0.20 to 0.80). An interesting 
feature of our study is that our range of outcomes covers and extends the range of outcomes 
investigated by Orbell and Dawes (1993). In this light, our findings extend prior exit research 
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by showing that, if in addition to games that promote defection also games that promote 
cooperation are included, exit actually has an overall negative impact on social welfare. These 
findings also illustrate that Orbell and Dawes’ (1993) selection of particular matrices might 
unintentionally have steered their conclusions, which underscores the great importance of 
considering various structural game features when investigating social dilemmas empirically. 
Limitations, Implications, and directions for future research 
A limitation of the present study is that we did not counterbalance the presentation 
order of the binary and the trinary set of games. While the order of games within either set 
was fully randomized, all participants were first presented with the set of binary situations, 
followed by the set of trinary situations. As a result of this, it cannot be ruled out that certain 
differences between the two games types might be due to the order in which they were 
presented. In order to rule out possible order effects, future studies should counterbalance the 
order of the different choice sets. Despite this particular methodological limitation, our 
findings rather consistently revealed that the addition of an exit opportunity mostly had a 
negative effect on social welfare when the dilemma situation was set-up in such a way that it 
elicited high cooperation rates. As such, a first important implication that arises from our 
findings is thus that, particularly in situations in which cooperation is the dominant response, 
exit options should not be implemented, as they may lower, rather than increase, the collective 
revenue. This implication may be especially relevant to policy makers in their attempts to 
enhance cooperation in real-world dilemma situations. 
Another interesting implication concerns the notion that the option to exit may 
promote the departure of not only defectors, but also of people who switch between 
cooperation and defection. The notion that these individuals may prefer exit above defection 
implies that their competitive behavior in binary situations may not only reflect the desire to 
exploit others, but also to shield oneself from their anticipated competitiveness (i.e., aversive 
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competition; see Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2009). Importantly, research has 
demonstrated that aversive competitors display substantial cooperation when presented with a 
cooperative partner, but chose to defect in the absence of such guarantees. Moreover, our 
findings on switchers imply that exit options also promote the departure of conditional 
cooperators, who may also exit out of fear of exploitation, despite preferring mutual 
cooperation. Accordingly, to understand how to maximize the conciliatory potential of 
trinary-choice situations, it is crucial to learn how exit may be avoided, particularly in 
aversive competitors and conditional cooperators. To do so, future research might, for 
instance, explore the effectiveness of communication and commitment devices, which have 
been shown to effectively promote cooperation in binary settings (Orbell, Van de Kragt, & 
Dawes, 1988).  
Ample prior decision-making research has shown that when games are played 
repeatedly with the same person, one player’s choices considerably influence the other 
player’s choices (e.g., Baker & Rachlin, 2001; Silverstein, Cross, Brown, & Rachlin, 1998). 
In this light, another interesting implication concerns the notion how the observed processes 
may develop over a longer timeframe. In single-shot interactions, the addition of an exit 
option not only rewards cooperators, but at the same time it penalizes defectors. An important 
question for future research is how these outcomes may influence decision makers in the 
longer run. Especially interesting is the question whether exit eventually will encourage 
particularly defectors to change their behavior − by reducing their tendency to defect in favor 
of exit, or even by adopting more cooperative patterns of interaction. Theoretical work in 
evolutionary biology suggests that exit options (or “optional games”) may evoke complex 
patterns of interaction over longer time periods, as their positive effect on cooperative 
interactions may eventually create circumstances that are ideal for an invasion by defectors 
(see Batali & Kitcher, 1995). Such simulations, however, tend to focus on the survival rates of 
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particular strategies, rather than on the way rationally bounded individuals may switch 
between choices in response to their social environment (or expectations thereof). As such, 
further insight into the “psycho-logic” of these processes in human players may prove 
valuable. For instance, reputation may operate differently under trinary than under binary 
conditions. On the one hand, shunning possible defectors may involve lower costs to players’ 
cooperative reputation than reciprocating (see Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004), and favorable 
reputations may help to reassure conditional cooperators (see previous point). On the other 
hand, however, shunning may represent a less powerful punishment to defectors, and may 
lead negative reputations to be forgotten rather than perpetuated through non-cooperative 
play. As these examples illustrate, studies into the “psycho-logic” of trinary games may 
enlarge our understanding of why and when people opt to exit. 
On a related note, the present results are also interesting in light of recent research by 
Van de Calseyde, Keren, and Zeelenberg (2017) which illustrated that buying insurance 
against the risk of betrayal has a hidden cost. More specifically, their findings revealed that 
the use of financial safeguards, which are intended to minimize the risky nature of acting 
cooperatively, might paradoxically increase the probability of betrayal (also see Falk & 
Kosfeld, 2006; Malhorta & Murninghan, 2002, for similar findings). In our study, choosing 
the exit option resulted in a fixed intermediate outcome that is located in between the mutual 
cooperation and the mutual defection outcome, and can therefore also be interpreted as some 
sort of insurance against defection by the other player. Because choosing the exit option 
(implicitly) signals distrust, it can be expected that choosing exit may also have negative 
social consequences in ongoing interactions. That is, it is possible that people will show less 
cooperation when confronted again with someone who previously has chosen to exit the 
interaction. In the long-run, the act of exiting on itself can thus be expected to undermine 
future cooperation (and as a consequence also social welfare). Future scholars who conduct 
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exit studies are therefore strongly encouraged to investigate how exit operates when people 
interact with others in iterated games. 
Conclusion 
Does the presence of an exit option benefit cooperation and welfare? Often it does not. 
Our findings indicate that, under certain circumstances, exit is a suboptimal strategy to 
maximize social welfare because it lowers the absolute number of cooperators and as a result 
also the collective revenue. Moreover, our research highlights that when investigating exit 
effects it is of crucial importance to take structural elements of the situation into account, as 
these have a substantial impact on the efficacy of the exit option. More generally, the present 
study showed that both research and practice can gain greatly in richness by giving more 
consideration to exit options in the study of cooperation, and we wholeheartedly encourage 
researchers to follow in Orbell and Dawes’ (and others) footsteps by doing so. 
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Table 1.  
Number and percentage of participants who choose each of the choice options in the binary-choice and the trinary-choice games. 
Note. The exit option is not included in the calculation of the relative percentages for the trinary-choice games. Small deviations are due to rounding
Matrix # Binary-choice Trinary-choice 
  
Cooperation vs. Defection 
Cooperation vs. Defection 
(= Relative Percentages)  
 
Cooperation vs. Defection vs. Exit 
(= Absolute Percentages) 
      Cooperation       Defection         Cooperation       Defection          Cooperation         Defection Exit 
1. High endowment, symmetric, low non-correspondence 148 (77.9%) 42 (22.1%) 90 (86.5%) 14 (13.5%) 90 (47.4%) 14 (7.4%) 86 (45.3%) 
2. Low endowment, symmetric, low non-correspondence 151 (79.5%) 39 (20.5%) 89 (85.6%) 15 (14.4%) 89 (46.8%) 15 (7.9%) 86 (45.3%) 
3. High endowment, asymmetric, low non-correspondence 128 (67.4%) 62 (32.6%) 79 (78.2%) 22 (21.8%) 79 (41.6%) 22 (11.6%) 89 (46.8%) 
4. Low endowment, asymmetric, low non-correspondence 102 (53.7%) 88 (46.3%) 74 (60.2%) 49 (39.8%) 74 (38.9%) 49 (25.8%) 67 (35.3%) 
5. High endowment, symmetric, medium low non-correspondence 143 (75.3%) 47 (24.7%) 79 (85.9%) 13 (14.1%) 79 (41.6%) 13 (6.8%) 98 (51.6%) 
6. Low endowment, symmetric, medium low non-correspondence 150 (78.9%) 40 (21.1%) 86 (82.7%) 18 (17.3%) 86 (45.3%) 18 (9.5%) 86 (45.3%) 
7. High endowment, asymmetric, medium low non-correspondence 113 (59.5%) 77 (40.5%) 82 (78.8%) 22 (21.2%) 82 (43.2%) 22 (11.6%) 86 (45.3%) 
8. Low endowment, asymmetric, medium low non-correspondence 95 (50.0%) 95 (50.0%) 75 (61.0%) 48 (39.0%) 75 (39.5%) 48 (25.3%) 67 (35.3%) 
9. High endowment, symmetric, medium high non-correspondence 140 (73.7%) 50 (26.3%) 67 (79.8%) 17 (20.2%) 67 (35.3%) 17 (8.9%) 106 (55.8%) 
10. Low endowment, symmetric, medium high non-correspondence 142 (74.7%) 48 (25.3%) 76 (77.6%) 22 (22.4%) 76 (40.0%) 22 (11.6%) 92 (48.4%) 
11. High endowment, asymmetric, medium high non-correspondence 100 (52.6%) 90 (47.4%) 64 (63.4%) 37 (36.6%) 64 (33.7%) 37 (19.5%) 89 (46.8%) 
12. Low endowment, asymmetric, medium high non-correspondence 89 (46.8%) 101 (53.2%) 60 (48.8%) 63 (51.2%) 60 (31.6%) 63 (33.2%) 67 (35.3%) 
13. High endowment, symmetric, high non-correspondence 123 (64.7%) 67 (35.3%) 55 (70.5%) 23 (29.5%) 55 (28.9%) 23 (12.1%) 112 (58.9%) 
14. Low endowment, symmetric, high non-correspondence 119 (62.7%) 71 (37.4%) 50 (59.5%) 34 (40.5%) 50 (26.3%) 34 (17.9%) 106 (55.8%) 
15. High endowment, asymmetric, high non-correspondence 93 (48.9%) 97 (51.1%) 61 (64.9%) 33 (35.1%) 61 (32.1%) 33 (17.4%) 96 (50.5%) 
16. Low endowment, asymmetric, high non-correspondence 75 (39.5%) 115 (60.5%) 47 (43.5%) 61 (56.5%) 47 (24.7%) 61 (32.1%) 82 (43.2%) 
Average (Matrix 1-16) 62.86% 37.14% 70.43% 29.57% 37.31% 16.16% 46.56% 
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Table 2. 
Results of generalized linear mixed model for the binary-choice games.  
Fixed Effects           se    z-value      p 
Intercept: Coop vs. Defect -0.13  0.20 -0.66 .391 
Endowment (Low): Coop vs. Defect -0.65 0.13 -4.93 <.001 
Symmetry (Symmetric): Coop vs. Defect 1.15 0.14 8.23 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Low): Coop vs. Defect 1.15 0.14 8.21 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Medium Low): Coop vs. Defect 0.87 0.14 6.30 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Medium High): Coop vs. Defect 0.57 0.14 4.23 <.001 
Symmetry (Symmetric) * Endowment (Low): Coop vs. Defect 0.74 0.20 3.76 <.001 
Note. Coefficients denote log odds. For non-correspondence, the “High” condition is always the 
reference category.  
 
EXIT, COOPERATION, AND SOCIAL WELFARE       Table 3 
 
Table 3.  
Results of multinomial mixed effects model for the trinary-choice games, with “Defection” as the reference level for the outcome variable.  
Fixed Effects            se  t-value      p 
Intercept: Coop vs. Defect 0.46 0.21 2.26 .024 
Intercept: Exit vs. Defect 1.90 0.18 10.62 <.001 
Endowment (Low): Coop vs. Defect -1.30 0.20 -6.55 <.001 
Endowment (Low): Exit vs. Defect -1.27 0.17 -7.55 <.001 
Symmetry (Symmetric): Coop vs. Defect 0.78 0.23 3.37 <.001 
Symmetry (Symmetric): Exit vs. Defect 0.84 0.20 4.21 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Low): Coop vs. Defect 1.67 0.22 7.62 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Low): Exit vs. Defect 0.46 0.18 2.52 .012 
Non-correspondence (Medium Low): Coop vs. Defect 1.58 0.22  7.26 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Medium Low): Exit vs. Defect 0.48 0.18 2.65 .008 
Non-correspondence (Medium High): Coop vs. Defect 0.64 0.21 3.03 <.001 
Non-correspondence (Medium High): Exit vs. Defect 0.03 0.17 0.16 .876 
Symmetry (Symmetric) * Endowment (Low): Coop vs. Defect 1.00 0.31 3.19 .001 
Symmetry (Symmetric) * Endowment (Low): Exit vs. Defect 0.81 0.27 3.04 .002 
Note. Coefficients denote log odds. For non-correspondence, the “High” condition is always the reference category.  
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Table 4.  
Earnings of cooperators, earnings of defectors, and aggregated earnings of the players. 
Matrix # Earnings of cooperators Earnings of defectors Aggregated earnings of the two players 
             Binary- 
           choice 
     Trinary-        
     choice 
          Δ       Binary-   
     choice 
 
     Trinary- 
     choice 
 
         Δ      Binary- 
     choice  
 
   Trinary-        
   choice 
         Δ 
1. High endowment, symmetric, low non-correspondence 14.02 13.06 -0.96 16.02 14.16 -1.86 28.93 23.55 -5.38 
2. Low endowment, symmetric, low non-correspondence 7.16 6.48 -0.68 8.16 7.02 -1.14 14.72 11.7 -3.02 
3. High endowment, asymmetric, low non-correspondence 12.13 12.17 0.04 14.13 13.23 -0.90 19.18 16.92 -2.26 
4. Low endowment, asymmetric, low non-correspondence 4.83 5.27 0.44 5.83 5.91 0.08 15.89 16.02 0.13 
5. High endowment, symmetric, medium low non-correspondence 12.05 11.82 -0.23 16.05 13.75 -2.30 26.07 22.02 -4.05 
6. Low endowment, symmetric, medium low non-correspondence 6.31 5.89 -0.42 8.31 6.99 -1.32 13.47 11.2 -2.27 
7. High endowment, asymmetric, medium low non-correspondence 9.52 11.44 1.92 13.52 13.63 0.11 16.71 16.59 -0.12 
8. Low endowment, asymmetric, medium low non-correspondence 4.00 4.93 0.93 6.00 6.22 0.22 15.00 15.86 0.86 
9. High endowment, symmetric, medium high non-correspondence 10.32 10.52 0.20 16.32 13.17 -3.15 23.79 20.93 -2.86 
10. Low endowment, symmetric, medium high non-correspondence 5.23 5.22 -0.01 8.23 6.77 -1.46 11.98 10.59 -1.39 
11. High endowment, asymmetric, medium high non-correspondence 7.36 9.40 2.04 13.36 12.59 -0.77 15.31 15.45 0.14 
12. Low endowment, asymmetric, medium high non-correspondence 3.28 3.98 0.70 6.28 5.92 -0.36 14.62 14.97 0.35 
13. High endowment, symmetric, high non-correspondence 7.76 9.36 1.60 15.76 12.64 -3.12 21.18 20.24 -0.94 
14. Low endowment, symmetric, high non-correspondence 3.76 4.37 0.61 7.76 6.14 -1.62 10.50 10.07 -0.43 
15. High endowment, asymmetric, high non-correspondence 5.87 8.90 3.03 13.87 12.86 -1.01 14.93 15.22 0.29 
16. Low endowment, asymmetric, high non-correspondence 2.37 3.64 1.27 6.37 5.91 -0.46 14.37 14.87 0.50 
Total (Matrix 1-16) 115.97 126.45 10.48 175.97 156.91 -19.06 276.65 256.20 -20.45 
Note. A detailed description of these calculations is included in Appendix B. The earnings of participants who selected the exit option are fixed (see Appendix A), and thus independent of the other player’s 
decision.
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Figure 1. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) values for the different cluster solutions. 
Smaller AIC values indicate a better fit. 
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Figure 2. Main effect of endowment size on the predicted probabilities for participants’ decisions in (A) the binary-choice games and (B) the 
trinary-choice games. 
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Figure 3. Main effect of (a)symmetry on the predicted probabilities for participants’ decisions in (A) the binary-choice games and (B) the 
trinary-choice games. 
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Figure 4. Interaction effect between endowment size and (a)symmetry on the predicted probabilities for participants’ decisions in (A) the binary-
choice games and (B) the trinary-choice games.  
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Figure 5. Main effect of non-correspondence on the predicted probabilities for participants’ decisions in (A) the binary-choice games and (B) the 
trinary-choice games. 
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